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ALEVIS IN GERMANY AND THE POLITICS OF 
RECOGNITION 
Martin Sökefeld* 
Introduction: The Discourse on Immi:,.rrants in Germany 
Migration has been among the most decisive influences shapinE; con-
temporary German society, deeply influencing not only economics and 
demography but also societal discourse and political practice. Legal 
issues concerning foreigners and immigration have been hotly debated 
in German society and have played a central role in many elections at 
both federal and provinciallevels. Recognition is an issue at the heart 
of these concerns. How are migrants viewed in Germany, as "immi-
grants" or as "foreigners"? As individuals who form a legitimate part of 
German society, or who have overstayed their temporary "invitation"? 
Who contribute to the economy and to public welfare, and or who live 
at the expense ofGerman society? Who are essentially alicn to German 
society and can at best achieve a liminal state of betweenness, or who 
actively and self-consciously assume a diversity of positions at alllev-
els of society? 
For Germany these are also questions of self-recognition, qnestions 
whose broad range can be summarized in the single question, whether 
or not Germany is a country of immigration. Outsiders may wonder 
why this matter is so hotly debated. Yet as Christian Joppke (1999, p. 
62) has remarked, this is not a question that can be answered at an 
empiricallevel-for example, by simply citing numbers of immigrants. 
It is also a symbolically loaded normative issue. It is not about what 
Germany is, but about what it should be, and what it is in essence. And 
although "essentialism" in various forms has been stringently cri-
tiqued, it remains a frequently encountered and powerful form of argu-
mentation in discourses about identity. Andreas Wimmer (2002) has 
recently emphasized that practices of exclusion and discrimination-of 
othering, I would add-are at the very core of the idea of the nation 
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state; they are not just its accidental excesses. In contemporary 
Europe, after decades of efforts towards supranational integration, the 
"others" of the various nation-states are henceforth not external ene-
mies, as in earlier times, but rather people of foreign origin living 
amongst the members of the nation. Thus the "other" that serves to 
define the self by contrast has been-at least geographically-internal-
ized. 
Varying degrees of otherness are ascribed to the different immi-
grant groups which have entered the country since Iabor migration 
began in the 1950s. Being Muslims, immigrants from Turkey are per-
ceived as being "more different" than, say, ltalians or Portuguese. In 
some cases, "Turk" almost seems to serve as a synonym for "foreigner" 
since, in their difference, Turks exemplify the very essence of foreign-
ness. From this point of view, immigrants from Turkeyare the para-
digmatic others of the German nation.1 
Identity politics generally work with !arge, rough distinctions. In 
spite of interest in such topics as hybridity and crossing over in acade-
mic discourse as weil as in some realms of the arts and popular cul-
ture,2 these concepts are frequently (re-)constructed in a public dis-
course that equates difference with difficulty. In short, immigrants are 
essentialized as a problem. In the case ofTurks, this problern is embod-
ied not only in religion but also in language. Recent debates on the 
necessity for (and difficulty of) integrating foreigners in Germany cen-
tered on the issue of language acquisition, and included demands that 
immigrants learn German. These debates nearly created the impres-
sion that Turks in general resist learning the local language-it was 
rarely mentioned that earlier Turkish "guest workers" had actually 
been discouraged from learning German because they were expected to 
return to their "home country." Similarly, Turkish-language media in 
Germany are often identified as a problern because it is assumed that 
they prevent immigrants from learning German and integrating into 
German society, and perpetuate a "Turkish" orientation, tying immi-
grants to a "homeland perspective."3 
1 Similar arguments opposing Muslim traditions to those of Christian.s were 
raised in Jate 2002 in Germany as part of the debate on Turkey's prospect1ve EU 
membership. 
2 See, for example, Bhabha (1994). See also <;aglar's critical perspective on 
hybridity (1997). . . . 
3 Although recent sturlies have abandoned th1s assumpt10n (see We1ß a~d 
Trebbe, 2001, and Wilamowits-Moellendorff, 2002), it still has great currency m 
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The predominant German view on migrants and migration, both in 
politics and in the academy, has been firmly based on "methodological 
nationalism" (Wimmer and Glick Schiller, 2002), an approach that nat-
uralizes national boundaries and problematizes migrants because they 
transgress boundaries and the whole "national order of things" 
(Malkki, 1997, p. 55). The debate on the "integration" of foreigners in 
Germany is framed in terms that demand an either/or decision, either 
for total integration (assimilation) into German society, or for retain-
ing attachments to the "home country," which make migrants perpetu-
al strangers in the "host society." Only recently have approaches 
towards transmigration and transnational social spaces which allow 
for the possibility that migrants might have multiple attachments, 
thus rejecting the either/or option, been introduced into German acad-
emic debates (cf. Pries, 1997; Faist, 2000). In political discourse, how-
ever, methodological nationalism has not yet been fundamentally chal-
lenged. 
This paper deals with the politics of identity that Alevi migrants 
from Turkey and their organizations have developed within, and in 
part against, the German migration discourse as roughly summarized 
above. It is based on research on local Alevi organizations in Harnburg 
as weil as on the activities of the Federation of Alevi Communities in 
Germany, the Alevi umbrella organization located in Cologne.4 The 
Alevi case is of particular interest because it shows that an orientation 
towards "integration" and a strong "homeland perspective" are not nec-
essarily mutually exclusive. As the Alevi example will show, a "horne-
land perspective" need not prevent "integration" in German society; 
rather, both perspectives may develop interdependently. Moreover, the 
Alevi politics of difference as practiced in Germany have made Alevis 
recognizable as aseparate community through reference to universal-
istic values emphasizing differences between Alevis and other Turkish 
immigrants. This strategy has facilitated the granting of a measure of 
institutional integration to the Alevi community of Germany, which in 
has turn yielded resources for a transnational politics of identity aim-
ing at formal recognition of Alevis in Turkey. Alevi efforts to be recog-
public discourse on migration; see also Becker and Behnisch (2001). Aksoy and 
Rohins (2000 and 2002) have argued that the study of migration and the media 
must go beyond approaches centering on categories of nation and community. 
4 Fieldwork was carried out from 1999 through 2003 and extended also to other 
locations in Germany and in Turkey. 
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nized as equal citizens in Germany, and efforts to achieve some degree 
of institutional integration (the latter process strongly influenced by 
the institutional character of German society; see Soysal, 1994), has 
made possible the opening up of a transnational space for identity pol-
itics. This strategy has made use of the changing state of relations 
between Turkey and the European Union as a major referent, and has 
consciously evolved alongside these relations. The Alevi struggle thus 
extends beyond relations within and between two nationally defined 
states. 
Politics of Recognition 
I subsume this case ofidentity politics under the rubric "politics of 
recognition," because recognition in a twofold sense-as equal and as 
different-lies at its core. Recognition in both these senses is sought by 
Alevis in Turkey as well as in Germany. Allowing for some simplifi-
cation it can be said that in Germany, Alevis primarily seek recogni-
tion as equals, as equal citizens, whereas in Turkey, recognition ofthe 
differences between Alevis and other compatriots is more important. 
Schalarship and opinion on the issue of recognition have largely 
dealt with the problern of recognizing cultural minorities and granti-
ng these minorities specific legal privileges enabling the preservation 
of their cultures. In an influential essay, Charles Taylor (1994) 
derives the necessity for recognition from a specific, modern idea of 
identity according to which an individual's identity is not fixed by 
being born into a particular position within a ranked, hierarchical 
society, but has to be worked out individually as well as within 
bounded collectivities. According to Taylor, a need for recognition is 
implicated in a politics of dignity which attempts to bridge the para-
dox that universal human dignity is attributed on the basis of indi-
vidual personality and idiosyncrasy, while at the same time, differ-
ence is celebrated along with the preservation of presumably shared 
features ("culture") which distinguish groups from one another. 
Current discussions on the politics ofrecognition, most frequently sit-
uated within a multiculturalist framework, have attributed more rel-
evance to this second aspect. Here, the hotly debated question has 
been whether a liberal democracy should recognize and "protect" cer-
tain cultures to the extent of establishing legal definitions of differ-
ence in order to ensure their continuity. Taylor offers the example of 
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Franco-Canadian culture in Quebec in this context. In his critique of 
Taylor's approach, Gerd Baumann (1999) has rightly pointed out that 
it is not preexisting cultures, endowed with inherent rights, that 
demand recognition and protection, but that cultures can be created 
by particular agents, often those in elite positions, in the very strug-
gle for recognition. 5 
Taylor's position is an attack on the liberal political theory that rec-
ognizes equal rights only among individuals and considers collective 
rights granted to minorities as a restriction on and violation of the 
equality ofindividuals. Against this liberalism, Kymlicka (1995) raises 
the argument that the "benign neglect" supposedly inherent in liberal 
democracy, which treats all citizens as equals and disregards cultural 
differences, is not actually benign since "equal rights" affect citizens 
differently in their diverse and unequal positions. Law is never neu-
tral, but reflects the cultural standards and values ofthe dominant sec-
tion of society while minimally concerned with those of others. 
Habermas (1997), in contrast, argues that the solution to this inequal-
ity cannot be found in a kind of "cultural protection of the species" by 
law, but rather in procedural provisions that ensure the articulation of 
disadvantaged positions on the basis of equal individual participation. 
Although the question oflegal protection of cultures has dominated 
the debate on recognition, it is not the most important issue in the 
German Alevi case. When Alevis in Germany demand recognition they 
do not seek a kind of protective discrimination, but rather voice their 
demands as a universalistic claim for equality, referring to universal 
human rights and a universal humanist essence. According to Soysal 
(1994, p. 116), referring to universalistic arguments has become a 
strategy of Muslim migrant organizations in Europe more generally. 
However, in cantrast to Alevi organizations, Islamic organizations 
often use such arguments in order to forward particularistic demands 
such as the right to wear the headscarf in schools or to slaughter ani-
mals according to Islamic rites. Alevis make no demands comparable 
to these. Th-e claim for recognition of Alevis qua Alevis in Turkey 
includes the demand for the elimination of a form of religious discrim-
ination practiced by the majority, embodied most visibly in the gov-
ernment's religious affairs agency, the Directorate for Religious Affairs 
5 For Taylor's example of Quebec, see Handler (1988), who analyzes how 
Franco-Canadian culture is constructed through identity politics. 
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(Diyanet j~leri Ba~kanhgL).6 The Alevi perspective holds that this 
agency protects only Turkey's Sunni Muslim majority and discrimi-
nates against them; Alevis are simply disregarded or, rather, officially 
subsumed without differentiation within the fold of Sunni Islam. 
It is, of course, a gross simplification to speak of "the Alevi perspec-
tive," since the question of "what Alevism is" may be answered in a 
multitude of ways. To begin with, an important binding force among 
Alevis is the historical perspective that represents Alevis as marginal-
ized, as suffering discrimination and even persecution at the hands of 
Sunni Muslims, throughout history. Yet since this is not the place to 
repeat accounts of Alevi history,7 suffice it to say that as a consequence 
of marginalization and discrimination Alevis resorted to what they call 
takiya, a strategy of intended dissimulation. Following this strategy, 
Alevis have generally held their rituals in secrecy and tried to pass as 
Sunnis within the !arger non-Alevi public. 
The present position of Alevis in Turkey is ambivalent. On the one 
hand, Alevism is no Ionger a matter of secrecy. Alevis can practice their 
religion freely, and since the early 1990s there is a widespread media 
discourse about Alevism (Vorhoff, 1995). This is the consequence of 
political changes as well as ofthe Alevi movement which, since the late 
1980s, has struggled for legal recognition of Alevism in Turkey.S On 
the other hand, however, Alevism is still silenced in official discourse, 
reflecting the lack of any form offormal recognition. As with other cul-
ture-based groups, Alevi organizations have largely been denied formal 
registration by the authorities if they carried the word "Alevi" in their 
name or if their by-laws refer explicitly to Alevism. This is due to the 
Turkish law on associations which prohibits organizations based on 
the assertion of cultural identity or differentiation within the Turkish 
nation. Associations created on the basis of, for example, Alevi or 
Kurdish identity, are seen as a violation of the unitary state presum-
ably founded upon universalistic principles-and ultimately as sepa-
6 This applies at least to the majority of Alevi organizations in Turkey. Among 
the !arger organizations, only Cem Vak[1 calls for Alevi representation within the 
Diyanet iiileri Baiikanltgt, this constituting one of the most important differences 
between this and other organizations. Also, Cem Vakft has not become a member 
of the Turkish Alevi umbrella organization, the Aleui Bektalii Federasyonu, which 
was formed in 2002. 
7 Fora comprehensive account, see Dressler (2002). 
8 On the Alevi movement in Turkey see Vorhoff (1955 and 1998), and Kehl-
Bodrogi (1992 and 1993). 
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ratism, the most serious political accusation in Turkey. Officials prefer 
to remain vague and evasive about Alevism. In August 2000, for 
instance, Turkey's liberal president Ahmet Necdet Sezer attended the 
opening ceremony of the annual Alevi festival in the central Anatolian 
town ofHac1 Bekta~ tagether with many other politicians.9 In his open-
ing speech President Sezer invoked freedom of religion but avoided 
using the words "Alevi" or "Alevism." Such an approach is symptomatic 
of the uneasy and equivocal position of the Kemalist state toward the 
Alevis: they may be honored by the presence of high officials at their 
events but are at the sametime denied explicit and formal recognition, 
for instance as a religious community on legal par with. th~ Sunni 
majority. This lack of official recognition naturally fosters insecurity 
among Alevis in Turkey, which is reinforced by the strong current of 
(Sunni) Islamist policy and by the number of instances of violence 
against Alevis that have occurred over the last decades. As a conse-
quence, many continue takiya on an individual basis and are reluctant 
to identify publicly as Alevis. Most also share a perspective that iden-
tifies the history of Alevism with a chain of violent acts against their 
members, a chain that links the battle of Kerbela in 680 which marks 
the early schism in Islam, via the persecution of Alevis during Ottoman 
times (when they were known as Kmlba~), with recent events aceur-
ring in Mara~? (1978), Sivas (1993), and Istanbul (1995). 
From Dissimulation to a Politics of Difference: Alevis in 
Germany 
Alevi migration to Germany from Turkey has been motivated by two 
major factors, economic (employment opportunity) and political. These 
reasons for migration entailed recourse to different legal avenues ior 
immigration, while changing circumstances in Turkey engendered a 
diversity of motivations for emigration over time. Labor migration 
started in 1961, following an agreement for recruiting workers conclud-
ed between the German and Turkish governments.10 Like Sunni Turks, 
many Alevis emigrated to Germany after migrating from villages in 
Central and Eastern Anatolia to the cities of Istanbul or Ankara. 
Migration of this category was halted by the ban on recruitment issued 
9 See Sinclair-Webb (1999) for an analysis of the festival in Hac1 Bekta~. 
10 See Jamin (1999) for the conditions of this agreement and early immigra-
tion. 
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by the German government in 1973. Politically motivated migration 
began within a few years after this, sparked by the tendency toward vio-
lent political polarization between extreme left and right wings; this 
form of migration reached its peak following the military coup of 1980. 
During this period many Alevis had been active in leftist organizations. 
A second phase of politically motivated migration began in the late 
1980s, caused by the intensifying war between the Turkish army and 
the Kurdish separatists of the PKK, bringing Kurdish Alevis engaged 
in or affected by the conflict. to Germany. Both labor and political 
migration were followed by migration via the legal avenue of family 
reunification, which allows for the immigration of spouses and minor 
children under certain conditions. This pattern of diverse avenues of 
migration does not distinguish Alevis fundamentally from Sunni 
Turkish migrants in Germany. Yet some Alevis argue that they were 
disproportionately affected by the first period of political migration 
because Alevis identified with the left side ofthe political spectrum and 
it was the leftists who suffered persecution after the coup. The German 
administration made no distinction between Sunni and Alevi immi-
grants from Turkey, since this distinction was neither known nor rele-
vant in the legal context. Consequently there are no statistics on the 
numbers of Alevis in Germany. Estimates by Alevi organizations vary 
from 500,000 to 700,000,11 but this may be a reflection ofthe politics of 
numbers in Turkey, according to which Alevis estimate their population 
at a fourth to a third of the total, while non-Alevi sources cite much 
lower figures. Nor, for some time, was the difference between Alevis and 
Sunnis known within the German public; and initially, neither Alevis 
nor Sunnis did anything to make it known. Alevi migrants in Germany 
largely maintained the strategy of takiya. I collected a nurober of sto-
ries from young Alevis who even in the late 1980s and 1990s had not 
been told by their parents that they were Alevis, mostly because their 
parents feared discrimination by Sunni Turkish immigrants. 
Within a few years after their arrival in Germany, the Sunni 
Turkish community had begun to build mosques.12 In order to avoid 
11 At present, roughly 2 million persons with Turkish citizenship are living in 
Germany. However, this number cannot serve as a basis for calculating the pro-
portion of Alevis since German statistics mention only citizenship. Also, many 
Alevis have naturalized and are therefore not counted as Turks (see below, section: 
"Institutional Integration and Difference," fn. 20). 
12 In Hamburg, for instance, the first Turkish mosque was constructed by 1969 
(Mih~lyazgan, 1990, p. 11) 
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reification of the differences between Alevis and Sunnis it should be 
emphasized that by no means were all Sunni migrants religiously ori-
ented and engaged in religious institution-building. However, the fact 
remains that there were no comparable efforts among Alevis to estab-
lish a religious life in the new country of residence. This was due not 
only to the continued practice of dissimulation and to a generally weak-
er religious orientation among many Alevis, but also to the circum-
stance that Alevi religious institutions cannot be easily relocated. The 
Alevi ritual cem which is at the center of Alevi spiritual life takes 
places less in a particular spatial and architectural structure, such as 
affered by a mosque, than in a specific social structure consisting of 
hereditary networks of religious leaders (dedes) and their followers 
(talips). A cem can be held only by a dede tagether with his particular 
congregation of talips. The dede-talip networks that had already been 
stretched and strained by internal migration in Turkey were damaged 
even more severely by international migration. In Germany it was thus 
impossible to bring tagether the congregations necessary for conduct-
ing the cem.13 
Alevis did not tend to form religion-based associations in Germany, 
but from the mid 1970s onwards, many participated actively in politi-
cal organizations. As with the politicalleanings of Alevis in Turkey, 
these organizations were situated on the left side of the political spec-
trum. Labor migrants overall were most likely to belang to parties and 
organizations of social democrat orientation, but while some Alevis 
became members oftheGerman social-democrat party SPD, most par-
ticipated in expatriate wings of Turkish parties. Thus, Alevis were 
among the founders of HDF (Halk<;L Devrimci Federasyonu, Popular 
Revolutionary Federation), the expatriate support organization of the 
social-democrat CHP (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, Republican People's 
Party), the party originally founded by Atatürk. The refugees of the 
late 1970s and early 1980<:, however, committed themselves to radical 
leftist groups like Dev Yol (Revolutionary Path).14 
The Alevi-Sunni distinction was not significant within any of these 
organizations; in fact, radical leftist Turkish Alevis were, rather, 
engaged in erasing that differentiation. Marxist teachings declared 
13 On Jater developments regarding the cem and dedes in Germany see Söke-
feld, 2002a, in press. 
14 See Özcan (1992) on the political organizations ofTurkish migrants in Ger-
many. 
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religion an obstacle to progress, thus, to insist on being Alevi would 
have been tantamount to taking a reactionary stance. Elements of 
Alevism did play a certain roJe in leftist movements because they were 
sometimes presented as a historical antecedent of socialism. In that 
context a very limited image of Alevism was constructed, and it was by 
no means supposed that Alevism as a religious teaching should be fol-
Jowed. In the early 1970s, young radical Alevis had already been 
engaged in driving Alevism out oftheir villages by denouncing dedes as 
exploiters ofthe people and preventing them from conducting the cem. 
Over the course of the decade, the difference between Alevi and Sunni 
became, to a great extent, coincident with the distinction between the 
extreme left and the extreme right. 
It was in Jate 1978 that the Alevi-Sunni distinction became signif-
icant for the first time within Turkish political organizations in 
Germany The ultra-nationalist MHP (Milliyetr;i Hareket Partisi, the 
Nationalist Action Party) had instigated a nurober of violent attacks 
against leftists (i.e. Alevis) in various Turkish cities. In late 
December 1978 it provoked large-scale violence against Alevis in the 
southeastern Anatolian town of Mara1?, where more than a hundred 
Alevis were killed (Sinclair-Webb, 2003). Alevi members of the HDF 
in Harnburg demanded that their committee voice protest against 
this massacre, but the organization's Ieaders refused to do so because 
the Turkish government was headed at that time by Bülent Ecevit of 
the CHP and they did not want to criticize their own government. As 
a consequence, forty Alevi members of the Harnburg branch of the 
HDF resigned in early 1979 in order to found their own organization. 
Tagether with supporters ofthe Türkiye Birlik Partisi, an Alevi party 
in Turkey, they established the Yurtseverler Birligi (Union of 
Patriots) as an association of Alevis. Although the Yurtseverler Birligi 
was closed in 1984 following the military coup in Turkey, its activists 
organized the first public cem in Harnburg in that same year. Halis 
Tosun, one of the main activists of the early Alevi movement in 
Germany, recounts in his memoirs that the move towards separate 
Alevi organizations caused great consternation among the radicalleft 
organizations as well (Tosun, 2002, p. 34). However, it is important to 
note that these developments closely paralleled Alevi politics in 
Turkey: the word "Alevi" was not explicitly used in public, and there 
was no overt demand for Alevis' being recognized as a separate com-
munity. 
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The short-lived Yurtseverler Birligi went unnoticed by the German 
public, confined as it was to the "homeland" oriented politics ofTurkish 
immigrants. Yet at the sametime migration from Turkey increasingly 
became a public issue in Germany. Immigrants were asked to "go 
home," and the government of chancellor Helmut Kohl even sponsored 
their repatriation. Racist violence against immigrants became viru-
lent-in Hamburg, two Turks were murdered by skinheads in 1985. In 
opposition to both popular racism and official policies against foreign-
ers, a discourse of multiculturalism emerged which, in cities like 
Frankfurt and Hamburg, became embodied to some extent in public 
institutions. 
In Hamburg, the senate sponsored a nurober of intercultural cen-
ters in districts with high numbers of migrants, which attracted the 
participation of some Alevis. At the same time, many activists within 
Turkish immigrants' political organizations turned from purely 
Turkey-ariented exile activities to a perspective of engagement in 
Germany. For instance, a Turkish parents' council was formed to deal 
with difficulties experienced by Turkish pupils in the schools. Among 
Marxist exile organizations the revolutionary spirit had waned. Dev 
Yol was finally dissolved and some ofits former activists turned to mul-
ticulturalist politics in pursuit of equal rights and the recognition of 
cultural identities in Germany. In Hamburg, Alevis became active in 
various areas of the new multiculturalist politics as practiced at the 
recently founded intercultural centers. Yet alongside their multicul-
turalist activities in Germany they still monitared the political situa-
tion in Turkey. 
Two developments in Turkey especially caught their attention: first, 
state-sponsored pressure towards "Sunnification" (Jongerden, 2003, p. 
80), perceived, for instance, in the compulsory (Sunni) religious instruc-
tion in the schools, paralleled a rise of Islamist politics more generally. 
The second development was the militant struggle of the Kurdish 
Workers Party (PKK) for the recognition of Kurdish identity and the 
establishment of a Kurdish state. Alevi activists in Harnburg came to 
the conclusion that not only Kurdish but also Alevi identity remained 
unacknowledged and were endaugered in Turkey. Thus, in Germany, 
multiculturalism should not only strive for the recognition ofTurkish or 
Kurdish culture but also, specifically, that of Alevi culture. In December 
1988, twelve activists in Harnburg founded an "Alevi Culture Group" 
(Alevi Kültür Gurubu) with the purpese of working for the recognition 
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of Alevi culture and identity in Germany. The group grew quickly and 
organized a large public festival, the "Alevi Culture Week," which took 
place in October 1989. This was the firsttime that an event was explic-
itly announced in the namf' of Alevis, and it drew Alevi intellectuals 
and musicians from Turkey for panel discussions and concerts, and 
numerous Alevi migrants from not only Harnburg but all over 
Germany. In the following years Alevi culture centers were established 
throughout the country. Three years later most of these local associa-
tions united in an umbrella organization, the Federation of Alevi 
Communities. The movement gained further momentum after an Alevi 
culture festival in the Turkish city of Sivas was attacked by Islamists 
in July 1993. The hotel housing the participants was set on fire, caus-
ing the death of 36 people. This "Sivas massacre" (Siuas katliamL) moti-
vated many Alevis in Germany to join the new Alevi movement. 
Developments towards self-organization in Germany were paralleled by 
an intensive media discourse on Alevism in Turkey (Vorhoff, 1995). 
Recognition, Difference, and the German Public 
Alevi Culture Week can be understood as an event that intended to 
break with the dissimulation of Alevi identity or takiya, an impression 
supported by the issuing of the "Alevi Declaration" (Aleui Bildirgesi), 
which made the claim for recognition explicit.15 The greater part ofthe 
declaration deals with the situation of Alevis in Turkey and demands 
that Alevis be recognized in Turkey as both equal (i.e. as Muslims and 
not as a heterodox or non-believers) and different, with particular 
teachings and traditions. The declaration most particularly calls for 
the reform of the Directorate for Religious Affairs on the grounds that 
it negates Alevism; it also is a plea for religious freedom for Alevis to 
practice their rituals without restriction. 
Several paragraphs of the declaration also deal with the situation of 
Alevis in Germany, where a similar diagnosis is made: Alevism was 
unacknowledged also in Germany, where public debates on Islam had 
15 This declaration is reprinted in Tosun (2002, p. 98-101), while a facsimile of 
the original declaration can be found in Harnburg Aleui Kültür Merkezi (1999, p. 
14). The declaration was drafted by Alevis in Harnburg in cooperation with Alevi 
intellectuals like R1za Zelyut in Turkey. In May 1990 a similar declaration signed 
by many well-known intellectuals and artists (both Alevi and non-Alevi) was pub-
lished in the Turkish daily Cumhuriyet. This second declaration has been repub-
lished in Zelyut (1990, p. 295-301) and Kaleli (1997, p. 182-187). 
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referred exclusively to Sunni Islam and been silent regarding Alevism. 
But the declaration also states that because of religious freedom in Ger-
many, Alevis have had the opportunity to practice Alevism and to enligh-
ten both their Sunni fellow migrants from Turkey and the German pub-
lic about it. The declaration demands not only the recognition of Alevism 
as a separate culture but also mentions differences between Alevis and 
Sunnis that, it is claimed, allow for easier understanding between Alevis 
and Germans than might be possible between Sunnis and Germans. 
Tam(t)mak: The Many Meanings of Recognition 
The Turkish verbs tammak and tanztmak have become prominent 
words in the discourse of Alevi organizations in Germany. Tanzmak 
means "to know," "tobe acquainted with," "to recognize." Tanztmak is 
the verb's causative form, thus meaning "to make known," "to cause to 
be recognized." Alevi organizations made efforts to make Alevism 
known and recognized, as in Hamburg, where one ofthe first activities 
of the newly founded Alevi Culture Center was to organize a series of 
lectures on Alevism in collaboration with the university, followed by a 
program of seminars. The organizations were always eager to invite 
German dignitaries such as members of parliament, mayors, or uni-
versity professors to their events, since their presence was considered 
a token of recognition. 
Yet Alevis had to deal with the fact that the German public did not 
distinguish between different kinds of Turks or different kinds of 
Muslims. In order to become visible as a community and as a form of 
belief, Alevis had to distinguish themselves publicly from Turkish 
Sunni immigrants. Thus the cantrast they presented in regard to 
Sunni Islam became the major point of strategic leverage for their 
process of self-definition. Unlike the strategy frequently used by immi-
grant communities by which their identity is defined in contradistinc-
tion to the native majority, Alevis highlighted not the cantrast between 
Alevi and German culture but rather that between themselves and 
Sunni Muslims. In doing so, emphasis was placed on the compatibility 
of German and Alevi cultures. It was especially pointed out what 
Alevis, in cantrast to Sunnis, do not do: fast during Ramadan, go to the 
mosque to pray five times a day, make the pilgrimage to Mecca, take 
the Quran as God's literal revelation-nor practice the veiling ofwomen 
or separation of the sexes. 
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At least in the first years of the Alevi movement, then, its members 
were more eager to explain what they did not do in cantrast to Sunnis, 
than what they did do as defining elements of their own practice. To a 
certain extent this was a logical outcome ofthe many ruptures that the 
Alevi tradition had suffered, migration being only one of many causes 
of these ruptures. Many Alevis in Germany still have only very rudi-
mentary positive knowledge about Alevism, its teachings and rituals. 
However, I would like to point out that the discourse on "what Alevis 
do not do" closely reproduces the dominant discourse on Islam in 
Germany. That is, in m.aking this cantrast they dissociate themselves 
from the prevalent image of Islam. The headscarf of Muslim women 
plays a particularly important role in this respect. For many Germans 
the headscarf signifies not only discrimination against and the repres-
sion of warnen as weil as patriarchal family structures in Islam, but 
also the perceived isolationism and intolerance of Islam in generai.l6 
It has become the main symbol for all negative stereotypes associated 
with Islam, expressing what is considered its essential anti-modernity. 
In order to distance themselves from such stereotypes-and thus from 
the dominant image of Islam in Germany-Alevis never tire of pointing 
out that Alevi warnen do not wear the headscarf. In the context of the 
gross distinctions put forward by the German foreigner discourse 
which categorizes Muslims as anti-modern and the "most different" 
and difficult of immigrants, Alevis position themselves firmly on the 
side ofmodernity, that is, on the German side ofthe divide. They make 
efforts to represent themselves as non-foreign (or "not so foreign") for-
eigners. 
For Alevis, the intolerant and violent essence of Islam had been 
most clearly revealed in the 1993 events in Sivas.l7 Sivas is commem-
16 Much has been written about the headscarf as a symbol. For a general dis-
cussion see Mandel (1988). Karakaqoglu-Aydm (1999) analyzes a specific head-
scarf-related conflict that was taken to court. On western discourse about Muslim 
women in general see Künzler (1999) and Pinn and Wehner (1995). For quite dif-
ferent self-perspectives of young Muslim women in Germany, see Nökel (1999). 
17 Based on her fieldwork among Alevis and Sunnis in Berlin in the 1980s, 
Ruth Mandel writes: "While Alevis abroad are doubly liminal, with respect to both 
Germans and Sunni Turks, their relative position uis·a·uis Sunnis has undergone 
a transposition. In West Germany, the reference point !lf Sunni dominance 
becomes less and less relevant. Alevis, who in Turkey had defi.1d themselves pri-
marily in opposition to Sunnis, and always in reference to them, have in some 
respects gradually replaced the latter with Germans in the process of reconstitut-
ing their identity abroad" (1989, p. 44). From my fieldwork I cannot confirm this 
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orated annually by Alevi organizations at both the local and the feder-
allevel in Germany, in honor of the victims as well as to pubHeize the 
dangers of Islamic fundamentalism. In this context, the German pub-
lic is sometimes criticized for not sufficiently recognizing the difference 
between Alevis and Sunnis. As stated in a German-language brochure 
on Sivas published by the Alevi Federation in 2001, "It is perplexing 
why the German public falls short in recognizing the traditionally 
democratic outlock ofthe Alevis, and thus fails to take [this communi-
ty] into account in discussions on Islam in Germany. In this way the 
German public overlooks a community of about 600,000 among the 
immigrants from Turkey, who abide by German laws and introduce a 
great democratic potential into German society."18 
The essential message in this call for recognition by the authorities 
and the public is not so much that of Alevism as a distinct culture in 
need of protection and preservation (as in Taylor's case of Quebecois 
culture), but rather that of the Alevis' commitment to the presumed 
universal values of modernity, among them democracy, tolerance, and 
humanism. The Alevi politics of difference includes the emphasis that 
Alevis do not make derogatory distinctions among diverse cultures, but 
accept the dignity and equality of all human beings. The sayings of 
Hac1 Bekta§ Veli, the most important Alevi saint, are frequently quot-
ed to illustrate the universalist essence of Alevism. One of his most 
well-known sayings is "72 millete bir nazarla bak." Literally, it means 
"view 72 nations with the same lock," and is generally interpreted as 
an appeal to regard all people as equal, thereby expressing an empha-
sis on equality and tolerance in Alevism. Another adage, "Benim 
kabem insandLr"-"My Kaaba is the human being," is understood as 
meaning that the human being and human values are at the core of 
Alevism, not some non-human religious object like the Kaaba in Mecca, 
as in the case of Islam. Large banners with such sayings frequently 
decorate the halls in which cultural events commemorating Sivas take 
place.l9 In SlJCh cüntexts, the opposition of (Sunni) Islam, represented 
gradual replacement of the Alevi-Sunni difference by the Alevi-German difference 
in Alevi discourses of self-identification. As identifications are historically dynam-
ic, this contradiction may be explained by the fact that Mandel's research took 
place before Sivas and mine after it, because Sivas clearly led to a stricter empha-
sis on the Alevi-Sunni difference among Alevis (Karakaqoglu-Aydm, 2001, p. 314). 
18 AABF, (n.d.),"p. 6. 
19 Such banners are also popular at Alevi events in Turkey, where they signal 
the Alevi commitmc>nt to the secularist ideology of thc Turkish republic. 
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as violent and intolerant, to Alevism as open, tolerant and humanist, 
is energetically emphasized. 
Institutional Integration and Difference 
Although many Alevis are still not satisfied with the degree of pub-
lic recognition they enjoy in Germany it canno.t be denied that, after 
more than ten years of organized efforts, the Alevi community has 
made major advances in this regard. Many more Germans now know 
that there are both Sunnis and Alevis among the immigrants from 
Turkey, and have some idea about the difference between these groups. 
In addition to discursive recognition, institutional integration has also 
been achieved to a considerable extent. By institutional integration I 
refer to cooperative relations that have been established between Alevi 
· organizations and various German civil and governmental institutions. 
According to Soysal (1994), the institutional models and resources pro-
vided by the immigration country play an important role in shaping 
both migrant organizations and the immigrants' incorporation into 
local society. In this sense, the institutional integration of Alevis in 
Germany is an outcome of the interaction of Alevi efforts with the 
German institutional environment. 
A central area of concern in this regard is religious instruction; 
since the early 1990s, religious instruction for Muslim children in 
German schools has been a topic of debate. Behind efforts in support of 
such instruction is the rationale that it could help to deter Muslim chil-
dren from going to "fundamentalist" Quran schools. Due to a great 
number of political and legal difficulties only a few limited initiatives 
in Islamic instruction have been implemented so far. Shortly after this 
issue first emerged, the Alevi position was that their children required 
instruction specifically in Alevism and not in Islam in general, on the 
assumption that under the rubric of Islamic instruction only the dom-
inant Sunni or Shiite versions of Islam would be presented. 
In 1995 the Alevi Culture Center in Harnburg joined in the 
"Roundtable for Interfaith Instruction" ("Gesprächskreis interreligiöser 
Religionsunterricht"), a body, sponsored by the Protestant church, in 
which representatives of Christian, Buddhist, Jewish, Muslim (both 
Shii and Sunni), and Alevi communities worked tagether on behalf of 
joint religious instruction. The German school system is federally orga-
nized, with each German Bundesland (province) having its own regu-
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lations. In Hamburg, unlike in other Bundesländer, there is no denom-
inationally separate Christian religions instruction. The Roundtable 
was established in order to open religious instruction to non-Christian 
communities, and interfaith curricula were drafted with the effect that 
units on Alevism are now also part of the curriculum of religious 
instruction in Hamburg. Thus Alevism is recognized by both the 
church and the education authorities. Because of this interdenomina-
tional instruction for all, Alevis in Harnburg do not insist on separate 
Alevi classes. The case is different for other Bundesländer, where 
Alevis demand separate instruction. Due to legal peculiarities in 
Berlin, an Islamic federation said to be related to Milli Görü§, the 
largest Islamist organization of Turkish migrants in Germany, has 
been granted the right to offer Islamic instruction in the public schools 
of the city. Consequently, the largest Alevi organization in Berlin 
applied to offer Alevi instruction and was allowed to teach Alevism in 
primary schools starting in the summer of 2002. Because this was the 
first-ever instance of separate Alevi religious instruction in the school, 
the Berlin authorities' decision was much acclaimed by Alevis. 
Institutional integration of the Alevis in Germany can be observed 
in other fields as well. After a social-democrat/green coalition came to 
power in 1998, more federal funds have been made available for the 
purpose of "integrating" migrants and combating racism. The Alevi 
umbrella organization, the Federation of Alevi Communities, has initi-
ated a number of projects that have benefited from such funds. An 
Alevi Federation campaign for promulgating information about the 
new citizenship law of 2000 making naturalization easier was funded 
by the Federal Ministry for Interior Affairs (see below, section: 
"Becoming a Citizen, Remaining a Foreigner"). Although the Alevi 
Federation did not explicitly promote the idea of naturalization within 
its community, this option was clearly regarded favorably and many 
Alevis have applied for German citizenship.20 Another federally fund-
ed project aimed at assisting disadvantaged youths, and more recent-
20 In a recent survey conducted with members of Alevi associations in 
Harnburg I found that 55.6% ofthe respondents had German citizenship, including 
9.8% who possessed dual citizenship (n=233). A comparison of these figures with 
the number of immigrants of Turkish citizenship in Germany (1,998,534 in 2000) 
and the total number of form er Turkish citizens who had naturalized as Germans 
by 2000 (424,512) (Beauftragte der Bundesregierung für Ausländerfragen, 2002, 
Tab. 6 and 16a) shows that the rate of naturalization is much higher among Alevis 
than among Turks in general. 
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ly, the Ministry of the Interior sponsored an initiative for enhancing 
dialogue among different religious communities. This project started 
with a large conference organized by the Alevi Federation in December 
of 2002 in Cologne, Asked in an interview why the Ministry funded the 
conference of a religious community, a Ministry representative replied, 
"We have no problems with the Alevis because they accept our political 
sys'tem. The Alevis are very open."21 This statement clearly illustrates 
the success of the Alevi politics of identity in Germany. 
The Alevi community in Germany has undergone many changes as 
a result of this process of engagement with identity politics since the 
late 1980s, among them achieving recognition as a religious communi· 
ty in Germany, as the examples of institutional integration presented 
here clearly indicate. Alevis now participate in interdenominational 
dialogue with other religious communities and are categorized as a 
religious community by the German authorities. Yet, when Alevis first 
began to address the German public in 1989, the objective was not the 
recognition of Alevism as a religious community per se. Many of the 
activists ofthat time had political roots in Marxism and conceived of 
themselves as atheists. Consequently they did not define Alevism as a 
religion, preferring to speak of Alevism as a "culture" (Sökefeld, in 
press). Of course, there were also religiously oriented Alevis in the 
associations, and some founded their own organizations. But they 
remained a minority faction and it was not due to their efforts that 
Alevism is now more generally defined as a religion. More effective in 
this respect was the German institutional and discursive environment 
of recognition. As Alevis defined themselves in contradistinction to 
(Sunni) Islam, requested Alevi instruction in schools, a~d cooperated 
with churches or other religious communities, it made little sense to 
insist that Alevism was not (or not only) a religion. In conversations 
with Germans, even self-declared atheists now introduce Alevism as a 
religious community. In September 2002, the Federation of Alevi 
Communities approved new by-laws which now explicitly refer to the 
Alevis as a "religious community" (Glaubensgemeinschaft).22 This step 
21 The interview was aired on the radio station NDR Info on January 5, 2003. 
22 At the same time, the Federation has been renamed "Aleuitische Gemeinde 
in Deutschland" (Aievi Community in Germany). In German, the word "Gemeinde" 
has a religious connotation. For purposes of convenience and because the organi-
zation is still called "Federasyon" in Turkish I use the old name "Federation of 
Alevi Communities in Gerrnany" throughout this paper. 
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was, in any case, required by the German institutional and legal con-
text because in most Bundesländer only religious communities may be 
granted the right to offer religious instruction in schools. 
The degree of recognition and institutional integration achieved so 
far does not mean that Alevis have been accorded the same formal and 
legal recognition enjoyed by the dominant Christian churches or the 
Jewish community in Germany. Except for the Jewish community, a 
special case because of German history, no minority religious commu-
nity in Germany has so far achieved this legal recognition. In 1995 the 
Alevi Federation submitted an application for the status of public cor-
poration (Körperschaft öffentlichen Rechts), the legal status enjoyed by 
the Protestant and Catholic churches. In cantrast to similar applica-
tions submitted by Islamic organizations, which have been almost as 
quickly turned down, the Alevi case is still pending. Thus Alevis find 
themselves at present in a liminal state of being neither accorded nor 
denied the finallevel of formal recognition. 
Transnational Politics of Recognition 
In addition to its efforts toward recognition and institutional inte-
gration in Germany, the Federation of Alevi Communities never aban-
doned its quest for formal recognition of Alevism in Turkey. 
Developments in Turkey of concern to Alevis have always been closely 
monitared from Germany. Frequently, the Federation of Alevi 
Communities as well as local Alevi organizations have staged demon-
strations, issued press releases, or organized panel discussions to pub-
Heize and protest events in Turkey. The language of these texts and 
events has in most cases been Turkish, and the impact of such activi-
ties has mostly remained restricted to the Alevi community, and has 
had no visible effect on politics in Turkey. 
However, a new committee heading the Federation of Alevi 
Communities has since late 2000 intensified the Federation's efforts 
toward institutional integration in Germany, combining these efforts 
with demands for recognition in Turkey. The Faderation has raised the 
issue of Alevis in Turkey in a number of meetings with representatives 
of the German government and members of parliament, where it was 
argued that the situation of Alevis in Turkey must be taken into con-
sideration in discussions on Turkey's accession to the European Union. 
Already in the 1990s, the Alevi Federation had initiated efforts to 
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establish contacts with European institutions and especially with 
members of the European Parliament. In European Commission 
reports from 2000 and 2001 on Turkey's efforts towards EU member-
ship, the situation of Alevis in Turkey was explicitly mentioned. The 
report of 2001, for example, notes that 
No improvement in the situation ofnon-Sunni Muslim communities 
has taken place .. The official approach towards the Alevis is 
unchanged. Alevi concerns have not been taken up by the 
Presidency of Religious Affairs. Particular Alevi complaints relate 
to compulsory religious instruction in schools and school books 
which fail to acknowledge the Alevi identity, and the fact that 
financial support is only available for the building of Sunni Muslim 
mosques and religious foundations (Commission of the European 
Community, 2001, p. 27). 
The latest report simply remarks: "There has been no improvement 
in the status of the Alevis" (Commission of the European Community, 
2002, p. 39). 
The efforts of the Federation of Alevi Communities in the area of 
trapsnational lobbying are known, if to a limited constituency, in 
Turkey. Hürriyet, the largest selling daily newspaper in Turkey, noto-
rious for its nationalist outlook, heatedly attacked the Federation for 
working against the interests ofTurkey and having become an instru-
ment oftheGerman government and the European Community. The 
Federation was even said to have betrayed the Turkish nation 
(Sökefeld, 2002b). However, after the newspaper's owner, Aydm 
Dogan, visited Germany in the summer of 2001 and met with a nuro-
ber of government officials including the German president, Hürriyet 
stopped its attacks and the editor responsible for them was dismissed. 
Shortly before this visit Alevi representatives had discussed the mat-
ter in Berlin and it seems they had succeeded in getting this issue onto 
the agenda for the meetings between Dogan and the German officials. 
Important demands made in the struggle for recognition in Turkey 
include permission to establish civic organizations clearly labeled 
"Alevi" which could then work for the explicit purpose of promoting 
Alevism. After several abortive attempts to establish a transnational 
umbrella organization of Alevis, the Federation of Alevi Communities, 
together with most of the Turkish Alevi organizations in Germany, 
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formed the "Alevi Bekta§i Kurulu§lan Birligi" (Union of Alevi-Bektashi 
Organizations, or ABKB) in the Summer of 2000. This umbrella orga-
nization has applied for official registration in Ankara. However, reg-
istration was refused and the ABKB was officially shut down; further, 
its committee members were accused of separatist activities. A mem-
ber ofthe committee, the chairman oftheGerman Federation, was also 
required to appear in court. The Federation launched a protest cam-
paign in Germany and, as the chairman was a German citizen, the 
German embassy in Ankara sent an observer to the trial. The charge 
against the committee members was dropped, but the decision on clos-
ing the ABKB was upheld. 
The organization appealed this decision, framing the issue within 
the context ofTurkey's accession to the EU and addressing it in a meet-
ing with members ofthe European Parliament in Brussels in February 
2002. The debate on Turkey's projected accession and the extent to 
which the country has met the political and legal criteria became espe-
cially intense in the second halfofthat year, when a decision was due 
on Turkey's formal candidacy status. In October 2002 the court of 
appeals referred the decision on the ABKB back to the first instance, 
which finally allowed the legal registration of the organization. 
Activists of the Federation interpreted this decision at least in part as 
an outcome of the EU debate in which Turkey could not permit itself a 
setback. Although the court decision does not create a precedent, the 
fact that the transnational umbrella organization is now oflicially per-
mitted to explicitly call itself "Alevi" is considered a major success in 
the Alevi struggle for recognition in Turkey. 
These examples show that Alevis in Germany have been engaged in 
constructing a transnational sphere ofidentity politics and a politics of 
recognition. They have accomplished this by making use of resources, 
acquired as a result of the institutional integration they have achieved 
in Germany and on the European level, to advance their struggle for 
recognition in Turkey. This case of identity politics is thus not limited 
to drawing ethnic or religious boundaries and constructing identities, 
but has entailed complex negotiations and strategies for participation 
in diverse political and public spheres across national boundaries. 
The national frames of reference that operate in Turkey and in 
Germany define Alevi migrants as Turkish nationals who should not 
"betray" their nation, in the case of Turkey, and as foreigners who do 
not really belong there, in the case of Germany. In this context, Alevi 
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organizations in Germany have been committed to defining Alevism as 
a supranational identity, thus independent ofparticular national iden-
tities and interests. Therefore, in cantrast to some other migrant orga-
nizations, the Alevi Federation is not engaged in preserving the 
Turkish identity oftheir migrant members. It has consistently refused 
to display Turkish national symbols such as the flag, or images of 
Atatürk, at its conventions. This has frequently been a contentious 
issue, as the Federation has been repeatedly criticized for this refusal 
not only by newspapers with a decidedly Turkish nationalist outlook 
like Hürriyet but also by Alevis themselves. Kemalist ideology, with its 
particular nationalist elements, was deeply rooted, especially among 
first-generation Alevi labor migrants. The de-nationalization of 
Alevism was mainly achieved by the earlier, Marxist-inspired phase of 
Alevi activism and entailed a strong and Iasting opposition to the 
· Turkish state and its ideology. This de-nationalization can also be seen 
as an outcome of the shift of frame of reference that came about with 
the introduction of an Alevi politics of difference among migrants in 
Germany. This move towards difference affered to Alevi migrants new 
options of identification beyond strict inclusion within the Turkish 
national frame of reference inherent in both the Turkish nationalist 
discourse and the German foreigner discourse. 
Becoming a Citizen, Remaining a Foreigner 
Concepts of citizenship have occupied a central position in recent 
debates on migration and multiculturalism. It has been pointed out 
that in Europe concepts of citizenship and the nation state-and most 
importantly, the relations between them-have been strongly affected 
by migration. Alternative concepts of belangingthat reach beyond the 
traditional notion of citizenship based on the ideology of the homoge-
neaus nation-state have been proposed, concepts such as "multicultur-
al citizenship" (Kymlicka, 1995). Indeed, many rights that earlier 
applied only to the citizens of a state-social benefits, for instance-have 
been extended to resident immigrants who retain citizenship in their 
country of origin. Yasemin Soysal (1994 and 1996) has emphasized the 
emergence of a new "postnational" model of membership that acknowl-
edges fluid boundaries and multiple belanging and is based more on 
the idea of universal personhood than on the idea of a particular 
nationality. However, in Germany, as in other states, unrestricted par-
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ticipation and complete rights are still available only to citizens. 
Debates on reform of citizenship law in Germany, and especially the 
abortive attempt to introduce dual citizenship, suggest that postna-
tional models will not be replacing the national model of citizenship 
any time soon.23 On the other hand, the new citizenship law iu force 
since 2000 has made naturalization, and thus the acquisition of all 
related rights, much easier. 
The Alevi Federation has encouraged naturalization so that Alevis 
might achieve unrestricted participation in German society, and has 
provided its members with detailed information on the new citizenship 
law. In abilingual brochure published by the Federation with financial 
aid from the German government, it is argued that "in order to have a 
voice and to achieve equal rights in this country, we must not only learn 
the language, but must also comply with the conditions of citizenship 
envisaged by the laws" (AABF, 2000, p. 4). In her preface to that 
brochure, the Undersecretary of the Ministry of the Interior writes: 
Migrants have contributed much to our common home. They have 
also contributed in making Germany more international and open 
to the world. The new citizenship law recognizes this achievement. 
It acknowledges the fact that Germany has changed. For the first 
time, children of non-German parents ... will become German citi-
zens by birth. From the first day of their life they will grow up as 
German citizens in Germany" (ibid., 5). 
These sentences capture the new law's rationale of welcoming new 
· citizens and acknowledging that Germany is an immigration country. It 
is significant that the reform of the law is presented as an acknowl-
edgement ofthe contribution ofimmigrants. Thus, the familiar rhetoric 
ofmaking demands on immigrants (to learn German, to integrate them-
selves, etc.) has been discontinued here. However, serious conflicts pre-
ceding the passage of the law reveal that this new attitude has not yet 
become common sense in Germany. Although the new law has intro-
duced elements of citizenship rights based on birthplace (jus soli), pop-
ular conceptions still hold citizenship as more a matter of"blood." Thus, 
citizens perceived as "non-Germans" due to their black hair, dark eyes 
or other details of physical appearance, are generally thought of as for-
23 Fora critique of the postnational model, see Kostakopoulou (2001, p. 94). 
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eigners and not as German citizens in everyday encounters. 
Young Alevis, like many other Turks who have grown up in Ger-
many, lament the persistent perception of themselves as foreigners ir-
respective of citizenship, emphasizing in interviews that they have ne-
ver feit "foreign" in Germany. Deniz, a young Alevi student of German 
citizenship living in Hamburg, had a somewhat different view. When 
we discussed experiences of home and of foreignness (Fremdheit), she 
reported feeling especially at home in Altona, a district of Harnburg 
with a considerable immigrant population, because she does not stand 
out there. It is different in other parts of the city where she frequently 
has the feeling that her dark hair draws attention. She then feels cat-
egorized as foreigner and regarded with skepticism and distrust. It is 
this skeptical gaze that makes her foreign even if she herself feels at 
home in the city. Thus German citizenship is not a sufficient condition 
for not being viewed as foreigner, and this experience has even been 
used as an argument against naturalization among Turkish migrants 
in some cases (Sauer, 2001). 
Conclusion 
In this text I have traced the Alevi struggle for recognition from the 
perspective of its evolution in Germany. But the issue is not restricted 
to Germany. The Alevi politics of recognition are now situated in a his-
torical context and a discursive space that spans two states and 
extends even into a realm of supranational integration. Alevi organi-
zations and their activists in Germany exercise their politics of identi-
ty transnationally, as illustrated by the close exchanges among Alevi 
intellectuals in Germany andin Turkey which led, among other things, 
to the drafting of the "Alevi Declaration." By inviting Alevi intelleetu-
als and artists to cultural events and panel discussions, German Alevi 
organizations benefited from steady contact with leading figures ofthe 
Alevi movement in Turkey, making possible an ongoing exchange of 
ideas. Yet the new movement ofpeople and ideas between the two com-
munities is two-way, as is evident in the case of a !arge cultural festi-
val featuring an artistic representation of Alevi history conceived and 
produced in Germany and first performed in Cologne in May 2000; it 
then moved to Turkey and was staged in Istanbul two years later in 
October of 2002. 
I have shown that this transnational engagement is not simply a 
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"homeland" perspective signifying non-integration and, at best, divid-
ed loyalties. The emergence of an Alevi struggle for recognition in 
Germany has been closely related to a change in a perspective from 
that of living in exile or as temporary "guest workers" to that of an 
immigrant orientation which involves putting down roots and · 
demanding equal rights in the (not so new) country of residence. 
Moreover, the recent commitment to transnationalize the struggle has 
been enabled by increased institutional integration within Germany, 
which made available new resources for a transnational politics of 
identity. 
Recognition is a multidimensional issue, involving a dialectic of 
complex relationships and negotiations between self and other. The 
Alevi struggle for recognition in Germany does not simply mirror the 
analogaus struggle in Turkey. In interpersonal encounters as weil as in 
collective processes, recognition involves both equality and difference, 
the search for acceptance as an equal partner in interaction and com-
munication as weil as the recognition of idiosyncrasy. It can be said 
that the Alevi struggle for recognition in Turkey has centered more on 
the issue of difference, whereas efforts in Germany have focused pri-
marily on the issue of equality. Citizenship and nationality make an 
important difference here. In Turkey, Alevis are recognized as full cit-
izens of the Turkish republic and as members of the Turkish nation 
and enjoy the same general rights as their Sunni fellow citizens. What 
they struggle for in Turkey is to be recognized as equal but different. 
In Germany, however, Alevis are clearly marked as different-if not 
quite in the manner they would like tobe. They are perceived as immi-
grants, Turks, Muslims, foreigners, lacking acceptance as ordinary cit-
izens in many instances. What is at stake in Germany, then, is recog-
nition as different but equal. 
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